## 1NC

### Off

Sunshine isn’t energy production

Division of Conservation of Solar Application, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 1980 “An Analysis of Federal Incentives used to Stimulate Energy Production”

<http://www.scribd.com/doc/67538352/Federal-Incentives-for-Energy-Production-1980> p42

Discussing governmental actions In a field that lacks consistent Policy is difficult, since boundaries defining energy actions are unclear. All governmental actions probably have at least some indirect relevance to energy. If a consistent Policy did exist, the discussion could focus on those actions that were part of the planned and consistent program. For this analysis, however, boundaries must be somewhat arbitrarily defined. First, this discussion will include only those actions taken by the Federal Government; relevant actions of state and local governments are not considered. Second, the discussion covers only those Federal Government actions in which major causes included an attempt to Influence energy or major effects included some Influence on energy. Within those limits, the discussion considers actions related to both production and consumption, although production receives the most emphasis. It also includes actions relating to both increases and decreases In energy consumption or production. Energy production Is defined as the transformation of natural resources into commonly used forms of energy such as heat, light, and electricity. By this definition, the shining of the sun or the running of a river are not examples of energy production, but the installation of solar panels or the construction of a hydroelectric dam are. Energy consumption is defined as the use of one of these common, "manufactured" forms of energy. Under this definition sunbathing is not energy consumption, but heating water by means of a solar panel is. In both definitions, the crucial ingredient is the application of technology and resources to change a natural resource into a useful energy form.

“Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan

American Heritage Dictionary 2000 [www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …To bring to a usually successful conclusion

Reduce excludes removal

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p.80

Mass. 1905. Rev.Laws, c. 203, § 9, provides that, if two or more cases are tried together in the superior court, the presiding judge may "reduce" the witness fees and other costs, but "not less than the ordinary witness fees, and other costs recoverable in one of the cases" which are so tried together shall be allowed. Held that, in reducing the costs, the amount in all the cases together is to be considered and reduced, providing that there must be left in the aggregate an amount not less than the largest sum recoverable in any of the cases. The word "reduce," in its ordinary signification, does not mean to cancel, destroy, or bring to naught, but to diminish, lower, or bring to an inferior state.— Green v. Sklar, 74 N.E. 595, 188 Mass. 363.

Restrictions are regulatory prohibitions

Words & Phrases 2004 v37A p410

N.D.Okla. 1939. "Restriction," as used in the statutes concerning restriction on alienation of lands inherited from deceased Osage allottees, is synonymous with "prohibition." Act April J8, 1912. §§ 6, 7, 37 Stat. 87, 88.—U.S. v. Mullendore, 30 F.Supp. 13, appeal dismissed 111 F.2d 898.— Indians 15(1).

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p414

N.II. 1938. As used in statute giving towns power to "regulate and restrict" buildings by zoning regulations, "regulation" is synonymous with "restrict" and "restrictions" are embraced in "regulations. Puh.Laws. 1926, c. 41. W A»-y\* r

Violations

The aff only speculates about USFG action on solar restrictions

1. Infinite regression—disregarding resolutional syntax produces an endless regression to small, trivial plans. For example, an aff only about the subject opens the door to ANY philosophy that speaks to ‘being.’

2. Limits—resolutional limits encourage AFF innovation, predictive research on a designated topic, and clash—a precursor to productive education. Also, the inherent value of arguments within limits is greater, which link turns education arguments.

If our interpretation is net-beneficial it means there’s no reason to vote affirmative. If the case is true then it de-justifies the resolution. Teams are still signified by ‘AFF’ and ‘NEG’, so the resolution is a required measurement for ‘affirmation.’

### Off

We Speculate that:

Text: the United States federal government removes all restrictions regulating solar energy production in the United States except those limiting silver in photovoltaics

Silver Net Benefit

The PIC accelerates a shift away from silver PV

Business Wire, 7-7-08, “Record-High Oil Prices a Boon to BioSolar: Company’s Cost-Saving Bio-Based Materials for Photovoltaic Solar Modules Poised to Decrease the Industry’s Oil dependency.” lexis

BioSolar, Inc. (OTCBB:BSRC) reports that surging oil prices have resulted in unprecedented price hikes in photovoltaic solar module manufacturing, creating substantial growth opportunities for BioSolar. The company's breakthrough technology dramatically reduces the cost of solar modules by replacing traditional and expensive petroleum-based components, i.e. silver or plastic, with bio-based materials derived from renewable plant sources. This dramatic pricing differential is expected to accelerate demand for BioSolar's products as manufacturers scramble to control skyrocketing manufacturing and components costs. "With the silver industry tittering and the plastics industry undergoing price increases of up to 40% for petroleum-based plastics, we believe that the cost savings offered by our BioBacksheet(TM) product will accelerate manufacturers' adoption of our product into their photovoltaic modules," said Dr. David Lee, BioSolar's CEO. "The savings will reduce the final cost per watt of solar electricity by allowing manufacturers to lower the cost of their finished product without being impacted by the rising cost of petroleum." A recent article in PlasticsNews underscores how manufacturers are impacted by price increases of commodity chemicals, as well as "almost unprecedented" run-ups in energy and raw materials costs. The June 22, 2008 article notes that companies are impacted not only by rising raw materials costs, but the associated electricity and transportation costs as well. Kevin Swift, chief economist at the American Chemistry Council, says, "Each $1 increase in the price of a barrel of crude oil costs the chemical industry $660 million annually ...For a $1 increase in 1 million BTUs of natural gas, it's $3.3 billion in new costs."1 "The market for solar power is already in explosive growth mode, and photovoltaic technology has progressed markedly in recent years with advances making the cells more efficient, lighter and less expensive. But BioSolar is singularly positioned to lead the development of truly sustainable and cost-effective solar technology as the first company to introduce a new dimension of cost reduction by replacing petroleum-based plastic solar cell module components with durable non-food, bio-based materials," said Lee. BioSolar is in the process of transitioning into full-scale production of its BioBacksheet(TM) in a 60,000-square-foot state-of-the-art facility operated by its contract manufacturing partner, Rowland Technologies, Inc. Enhanced Coverage LinkingRowland Technologies, Inc. -Search using: Company Profile News, Most Recent 60 Days By incorporating Rowland Technologies' world-class manufacturing capabilities with BioSolar's unique material engineering, BioSolar is producing an environmentally-friendly product with characteristics that exceed the thermal index requirements of solar module manufacturers. "We expect this breakthrough product to be rapidly accepted as the standard for the backsheet component of both traditional and certain thin-film photovoltaic modules," said Lee.

Ending PV solar restrictions would double the silver demand

Silver supply is too stretched to meet any new demands.

Jason Hommel, Silver Stock Reporter, 3/21/08. Silver Seek. “Silver Shortage gets Worse, Price Drops Again!”, http://news.silverseek.com/GoldIsMoney/1206119500.php

Three more major silver dealers are reported to be out of silver today: The U.S. Mint, Kitco, and Monex. This, on top of the major dealers yesterday, Amark, Perth Mint, CNI Numismatics, and APMEX, all reported sold out. Further, nearly all of Canada is reported to be out of silver, from Vancouver to Toronto. This is unprecedented, and is a perfect case of market manipulation in the paper market at COMEX and other futures exchanges to see silver prices continue to drop down to below $17/oz. today. Paper promises can be created endlessly, but real silver cannot. This is NOT a case of the dealers getting spooked, and selling out to the refiners just in time, at peak prices. This is a case of the public buying up the stock at coin shops across the world ever since gold hit $1000/oz.. That event finally sparked a little of the public's buying of silver and gold. Thus, the typical coin shop flow of silver to the refiners just stopped in the last few weeks, and especially the last two days. This is NOT a case of the public creating a top with 'everyone' in silver, because nobody's in silver yet. In 2006, only $1 billion was spent on investment silver, which is 0.007% of the $13.5 trillion of money in the banks. As I have long reported, the silver market is so small, there is no room for new investor demand, not even 0.1% of money could be spent on silver, because that would be $13 billion, which would push silver prices to $200/oz., and we are seeing only the tiniest beginnings of that.

Will ramp up use of finite metals

David Zgodzinski, Montreal freelance writer, 6-19-2008, The Gazette (Montreal), “NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND; Can mining make a greener world?”, VP lexis

Most environmentalists agree that the overriding environmental imperative, trumping other concerns, is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But converting from a hydrocarbon burning society to one that runs on cleanly generated electricity will not be simple or painless. And the switch will demand metals - lots of metals. Those metals have to be mined. According to a study by British merchant bankers, the Fortis Group, over 1,000 tonnes of silver will be used in 2008 to manufacture solar panels. That's twice the amount of silver that was used in 2002 by the solar industry. Silver is the most conductive of metals and that quality makes it a necessary element in solar equipment. More and more silver will be mined for the solar energy ramp up in coming years.

Silver supplies are key to the world economy.

Jason Hommel, Silver Stock Reporter, 2008. The Silver Stock Report. “Here’s why silver investment is better than gold,” http://silverstockreport.com/ MH

Each silver contract at the NYMEX is a promise. There are too many contracts, too many promises to deliver silver that may not exist. Each contract is for 5000 ounces. There are often over 200,000 contracts for 5000 ounces, that's a total of 1000 million ounces of silver promised to be delivered. With recent market trends of defaults and bankruptcies, these contracts are at risk of default. Yet the exchange has only about a third of that in real silver. How can they promise to deliver more silver than exists? If they fail to deliver silver, then confidence in the world's entire financial system may collapse. Industrial users of silver may have to shut down their factories. To prevent this, users will bid silver prices much higher.

Nuclear war.

Walter Russel Mead, fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, 1992 New perspectives quarterly, summer pp. 28

But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates - or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India - these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the '30s.

### Off

The affs use of the political as the background for their ethical action is the ultimate unethical act

Adam Thurschwell (Asst. Prof. of Law, Cleveland State University) 2003 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1193

Thus, as Derrida puts it, "ethics enjoins a politics and a law ... . but the political or juridical content that is thus assigned remains undetermined, still to be determined beyond knowledge, beyond all presentation, all concepts ... ." n26 No determinate content issues from the ethical demand because ethics, in Derrida's (and Levinas's) sense, is non-normative. To derive a legal or political rule of decision from one's ethical responsibility would be, paradoxically, to displace that responsibility onto a "calculation," and thus would itself be unethical precisely to the extent that it relieves one of further responsibility for the decision in any given case. Ethics therefore demands a legal/political decision that can only rest on something like a "mystical foundation," n27 since such a decision cannot be founded on any determinable rules, reasons or values without abandoning its claim to ethical status. Accordingly, the legal/political decision can only be "determined beyond knowledge, beyond all presentation, all concepts" n28 - which is to say, determined on the basis of something that resembles pure faith.

Alternative –Reject the affirmatives displacement of their ethical commitment on outside institutions but embrace the individual ethical responsibility embodied within the 1AC

Their focus on the atrocities that the government creates because of things like subsidies ignores and trades off with recognizing our own personal complicity with violence. Only by refusing to make statements like “the United States Federal Government should” allows us to transform our own personal will to violence that is the root of their impacts

Susanne Kappeler (Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University) 1995 The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behaviour, pg. 75-76

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war', writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war . . . And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happen.5 'We are the war' - and we also 'are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime', for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility — leading to the -well-known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens — even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution.'7 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

### Case

They cannot overcome economic systems.

Arkady Plontisky, 1995, , Professor of English and Theory and Cultural Studies, Purdue University, “On Bataille: Critical Essays,” State University of New York Press, p. 111

Indeed, as Bataille's discourse shows with extraordinary power, it is the economic insistence on consumption at the multiple and often interacting levels of theoretical economies—economic, political, conceptual—that is most problematic. The theoretical problem is a metaphoric loss of the economy of loss and thus of the general economy. It is not that consumption and the pleasure of consumption are not important or theoretically and otherwise pleasurable. To reverse the configuration absolutely and to privilege expenditure unconditionally would be just as untenable. As I indicated earlier, Bataille's heavy insistence on waste and expenditure must be seen as problematic in this respect, and is "saved" only by the enormous labyrinthine complexity of Bataille's inscription of these concepts.

Treating the sun as an accessable object undermines productive speculation – the AFF does not retain the restriction of parataxis – their belief that we can know the sun itself instead of just the object called our “relation to the run” link turns all benefits that flow from speculation

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The obvious question arises of how objects can interact at all if they're also absolutely withdrawn from each other. The second half of Towards Speculative Realism presents Harman's development of this question as well as his solution: vicarious causation. As he has it in an essay on Husserl, "Physical Nature and the Paradox of Qualities," "if hammers, rocks, and flames withdraw from all other entities, then it needs to be explained why anything happens in the world at all" (129); and "since objects cannot touch one another directly they must be able to interact only within some sort of vicarious medium that contains each of them" (TSR 131). Harman's very weird but absolutely ingenious and elegant solution to this problem is that this medium is other objects. Relations themselves are objects. Take again the bridge example: its bolts anchor its pylons into its concrete foundation which is itself dug into the ground. These are all objects in their own right, never encountering one another, always infinitely withdrawn. But taken together, in their relations to one another, the bolts and pylons and foundation and concrete form the bridge itself—which is also wholly withdrawn, even from its constituent parts. It's objects all the way down. Except there is no question of up or down—no level of reality (of scale, complexity, durability, nature, or physical existence) is any more essential or fundamental than any other: "an atom is no more an object than a skyscraper," "an electron is no more an object than a piano," and "mountains are no more objects than hallucinated mountains" (TSR 147-48). While the bridge is certainly composed of parts, the bridge itself is not any one of these parts, nor merely their sum. The bridge names the way in which its parts are related to one another, but it is not itself reducible to this bundle of relations. Throughout, Harman's ontology of an utterly pure, totally positive, completely inaccessible object licenses speculation as the only way we may ever reach anything like an encounter with the object itself. Since "there is no way of approaching equipment [objects] directly, not even asymptotically or by degrees" (47), the only way we have of thinking the withdrawn object or vicarious causation is metaphysics, "speculative theory on the nature of ultimate reality" (TSR 49). Two consequences follow from this. First, since we always miss the object, the ground for Harman's theory of objects cannot be the object itself. This is a phenomenology without a practice of description. At no point does Harman ever really address himself to any object in particular, and it is not difficult to see why. At best we see his characteristic stylistic tic of what elsewhere he calls a "poetry of objects" (Prince 101-103): "monkeys, tornadoes, diamonds, and oil," "hammers, drills, keys, and windows," "trees, atoms, and songs. . . armies, banks, sports franchises, and fictional characters" (TSR 95, 97, 147). This is a poetry whose only device is parataxis. As poetic device, parataxis levels all differences between its terms—which, I suppose, is precisely the point. No object has any privilege or right of dignity over any other. But as a collection of essays (instead of a book on a single thinker, like Prince of Networks), Towards Speculative Realism makes particularly clear a resulting difficulty in Harman's thinking. Instead of asking about any objects in particular, the essays all treat different philosophers and their theories of objects: Heidegger and Husserl, but also Lingis, Whitehead, Latour, and DeLanda. These are uniformly creative, opening these thinkers up in novel ways. Yet even in its object-oriented instance, it seems that the object of philosophy is really only ever other philosophy.

Even if Speculation can be productive, they center it on an object – in this case the sun – this form of speculation is unproductive and embraces the worst forms of correlationism – if the sun worshipers decide to sacrifice people, they have no grounds to oppose it

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These are questions about the nature of speculation in its conjugation by speculative realism. Of course, meditation on the nature of speculation cuts against the grain of the aspiration of speculative realism to break out of the correlationist circle and is much attenuated in TheSpeculative Turn. Attenuated, but not ignored. Ray Brassier and Adrian Johnston hit on the problem, and Alberto Toscano's "Against Speculation" poses it most fully in his treatment of the account of speculation Meillassoux gives in chapter 2 of After Finitude. In Toscano's words, correlationism "designates those structural invariants or transcendental parameters that govern a given world or domain of correlation without themselves being open to rational explanation, deduction or derivation. In this respect, facticity is a form of reflexive ignorance" (ST 85). The "strong correlationism" of Heidegger or Wittgenstein, or really, any anti-foundational philosophy that forbids or foregoes speculation on an ultimate reality behind facticity, is thus a "new obscurantism," "a carte blanche for any and all superstitions" (ST 85). Strong correlationism is complicit with the rise of religiosity because philosophy has removed any vocabulary or grounds for discussing the absolute and irrational. Meillassoux's brilliance lies precisely in the way his thought moves past dumb wonderment at facticity by ontologizing anti-foundationalism as absolute contingency. Here, realism and speculation license each other, and this is the crux of Toscano's critique of Meillassoux. The absolute autonomy of the real, and its absolute exteriority with respect to thought, frees thought from the necessity of being a correlate of being. Yet once you give up any pretension to correlation between thought and being, how can you claim that absolute speculation will have any purchase whatsoever on the absolute of the real? The questions of to what, to whom, in what modes, in what registers, and to what degree thought is (and ought to be) bound are questions that neither The Speculative Turn, nor speculative realist philosophy more generally, has quite known how to pose—even as it also makes them unavoidable. This inability is not unrelated to the uncertainty The Speculative Turn displays in the kind of impact it wants to have. The largely unvoiced question of speculation lies at the heart of what is both flawed and crucial about this volume. If speculative realist philosophy does not quite have an account of how to answer these questions, it poses them in urgent and novel ways. This is not merely to recruit Harman, Meillassoux, and others to the correlationist concerns of critical, cultural, aesthetic theory (etc.), or of what Adrian Johnston calls "ontic disciplines." But clearly the kind of purchase thought has on the world is of concern not merely to the speculative realists, but to practitioners of any sort of humanistic or critical thinking. You might even say it's of greater importance to those of us who "do theory": from a certain altitude, the "theory" that we "do," wedded as it must be to an object or scene of inquiry, is the real object-oriented philosophy, speculative thinking that does not know how to get on without an object. The speculative realist demand to radically rethink this relation (or non-relation), and this dependency, is crucial. Whether or not you agree with Harman or Meillassoux, or any of the others, the charge from speculative realism to disciplines and practices of thought more bound to the things themselves—as we discover them in the world—lies precisely in their challenge to correlationism, that is, to our received ways of conceiving of the relation between thought and its objects.

Inevitable extinction is wrong.

David Johnson, 2003, has a degree Phil. in English and Related Literature, an MA in Continental Philosophy, Warwick University, and Honors, in Literature and Philosophy, Middlesex Polytechnic, Time & Society, JSTOR

I shall assume that time cannot be separated from space, and that time is essentially a view of what happens to space. If we see time as encompassing all of space, it is difficult to see time as rushing headlong towards an end, since we must imagine time as having to move through the tangled matter of space to get to any end: a tortuous procedure. Time does not cut through space instantly like a magic knife towards an end, so why should we view all time from its end? Moreover, time is ‘everything that happens’, involving the irreducible durations of pleasure or pain, slavery or sovereignty. Again, with such a rich view of time, it is hard to see how time can be authentically described as slipping easily towards its extinction. Since time is made up of everything that occurs, the philosophical act of analysing time from the point of view of the annihilation of all occurrence is narrow to the most extreme degree. How can this backward glance, this posthumous look at time from the illusory vantage point of nothingness, not be an emaciated view, a ‘little’ view? How can such a narrow, such a restricted view of time not be a slave perspective in the Nietzschean sense?

Even without absolute truth we can create provisional consensus and common understanding

Ferguson 2002 Yale Ferguson (Professor of International Relations at Rutgers) and Richard Mansbach (Professor of International Relations at Iowa State) 2002 International Relations and the “Third Debate,” ed. Jarvis

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation. That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy the philosophical nit-pickers, but it can be educational and illuminating. We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”

Predictions are inevitable and good

George Friedman (founder of Stratfor) May 2008 “The Love of One’s Own and the Importance of Place” Stratfor

Forecasting is built into the human condition. Each action a human being takes is intended to have a certain outcome. The right to assume that outcome derives from a certain knowledge of how things work. Sometimes, the action has unexpected and unintended consequences. The knowledge of how things work is imperfect. But there is a huge gulf between the uncertainty of a prediction and the impossibility of a prediction. When I get up and turn on the hot water, it is with the expectation that the hot water will be there. It isn’t always there and I may not have a full understanding of why it will be there, but in general, it is there and I can predict that. A life is made up of a fabric of such expectations and predictions. There is no action taken that is not done with the expectation, reasonable or not, erroneous or not, of some predictable consequence. The search for predictability suffuses all of the human condition. Students choose careers by trying to predict what would please them when they are 30 years older, what would be useful and therefore make them money and so on. Businesses forecast what can be sold and to whom. We forecast the weather, the winners of elections, the consequences of war and so on. There is no level on which human beings live that they don’t make forecasts and, therefore, on which they don’t act as if the world were to some degree predictable.

Predictions are good – they are key to prevent catastrophic violence even if they are inaccurate

Fuyuki Kurasawa Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004 Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.

Planning for uncertain events is good- mere speculation ensures that we only speculate on things that we already agree with

Michael Fitzsimmons 2007 [survival, vol 48, no 4, p.139]

Uncertainty is not a new phenomenon for strategists. Clausewitz knew that 'many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain'. In coping with uncertainty, he believed that 'what one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. He should be guided by the laws of probability.'34 Granted, one can certainly allow for epistemological debates about the best ways of gaining 'a standard of judgment' from 'knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense'. Scientific inquiry into the 'laws of probability' for any given strategic question may not always be possible or appropriate. Certainly, analysis cannot and should not be presumed to trump the intuition of decision-makers. Nevertheless, Clausewitz's implication seems to be that the burden of proof in any debates about planning should belong to the decision-maker who rejects formal analysis, standards of evidence and probabilistic reasoning. Ultimately, though, the value of prediction in strategic planning does not rest primarily in getting the correct answer, or even in the more feasible objective of bounding the range of correct answers. Rather, prediction requires decision-makers to expose, not only to others but to themselves, the beliefs they hold regarding why a given event is likely or unlikely and why it would be important or unimportant. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May highlight this useful property of probabilistic reasoning in their renowned study of the use of history in decision-making, Thinking in Time. In discussing the importance of probing presumptions, they contend: The need is for tests prompting questions, for sharp, straightforward mechanisms the decision makers and their aides might readily recall and use to dig into their own and each others' presumptions. And they need tests that get at basics somewhat by indirection, not by frontal inquiry: not 'what is your inferred causation, General?' Above all, not, 'what are your values, Mr. Secretary?'… If someone says 'a fair chance'… ask, 'if you were a betting man or woman, what odds would you put on that?' If others are present, ask the same of each, and of yourself, too. Then probe the differences: why? This is tantamount to seeking and then arguing assumptions underlying different numbers placed on a subjective probability assessment. We know of no better way to force clarification of meanings while exposing hidden differences… Once differing odds have been quoted, the question 'why?' can follow any number of tracks. Argument may pit common sense against common sense or analogy against analogy. What is important is that the expert's basis for linking 'if' with 'then' gets exposed to the hearing of other experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.'35 There are at least three critical and related benefits of prediction in strategic planning. The first reflects Neustadt and May's point - prediction enforces a certain level of discipline in making explicit the assumptions, key variables and implied causal relationships that constitute decision-makers' beliefs and that might otherwise remain implicit. Imagine, for example, if Shinseki and Wolfowitz had been made to assign probabilities to their opposing expectations regarding post-war Iraq. Not only would they have had to work harder to justify their views, they might have seen more clearly the substantial chance that they were wrong and had to make greater efforts in their planning to prepare for that contingency. Secondly, the very process of making the relevant factors of a decision explicit provides a firm, or at least transparent, basis for making choices. Alternative courses of action can be compared and assessed in like terms. Third, the transparency and discipline of the process of arriving at the initial strategy should heighten the decision-maker's sensitivity toward changes in the environment that would suggest the need for adjustments to that strategy. In this way, prediction enhances rather than undermines strategic flexibility. This defence of prediction does not imply that great stakes should be gambled on narrow, singular predictions of the future. On the contrary, the central problem of uncertainty in planning remains that any given prediction may simply be wrong. Preparations for those eventualities must be made. Indeed, in many cases, relatively unlikely outcomes could be enormously consequential, and therefore merit extensive preparation and investment. In order to navigate this complexity, strategists must return to the distinction between uncertainty and risk. While the complexity of the international security environment may make it somewhat resistant to the type of probabilistic thinking associated with risk, a risk-oriented approach seems to be the only viable model for national-security strategic planning. The alternative approach, which categorically denies prediction, precludes strategy. As Betts argues, Any assumption that some knowledge, whether intuitive or explicitly formalized, provides guidance about what should be done is a presumption that there is reason to believe the choice will produce a satisfactory outcome - that is, it is a prediction, however rough it may be. If there is no hope of discerning and manipulating causes to produce intended effects, analysts as well as politicians and generals should all quit and go fishing.36 Unless they are willing to quit and go fishing, then, strategists must sharpen their tools of risk assessment. Risk assessment comes in many varieties, but identification of two key parameters is common to all of them: the consequences of a harmful event or condition; and the likelihood of that harmful event or condition occurring. With no perspective on likelihood, a strategist can have no firm perspective on risk. With no firm perspective on risk, strategists cannot purposefully discriminate among alternative choices. Without purposeful choice, there is no strategy. \* \* \* One of the most widely read books in recent years on the complicated relationship between strategy and uncertainty is Peter Schwartz's work on scenario-based planning, The Art of the Long View. Schwartz warns against the hazards faced by leaders who have deterministic habits of mind, or who deny the difficult implications of uncertainty for strategic planning. To overcome such tendencies, he advocates the use of alternative future scenarios for the purposes of examining alternative strategies. His view of scenarios is that their goal is not to predict the future, but to sensitise leaders to the highly contingent nature of their decision-making.37 This philosophy has taken root in the strategic-planning processes in the Pentagon and other parts of the US government, and properly so. Examination of alternative futures and the potential effects of surprise on current plans is essential. Appreciation of uncertainty also has a number of organisational implications, many of which the national-security establishment is trying to take to heart, such as encouraging multidisciplinary study and training, enhancing information sharing, rewarding innovation, and placing a premium on speed and versatility. The arguments advanced here seek to take nothing away from these imperatives of planning and operating in an uncertain environment. But appreciation of uncertainty carries hazards of its own. Questioning assumptions is critical, but assumptions must be made in the end. Clausewitz's 'standard of judgment' for discriminating among alternatives must be applied. Creative, unbounded speculation must resolve to choice or else there will be no strategy. Recent history suggests that unchecked scepticism regarding the validity of prediction can marginalise analysis, trade significant cost for ambiguous benefit, empower parochial interests in decision-making, and undermine flexibility. Accordingly, having fully recognised the need to broaden their strategic-planning aperture, national-security policymakers would do well now to reinvigorate their efforts in the messy but indispensable business of predicting the future

Energy POLICY matters and we need policy action to address the pressing energy needs of the US and the world- Must evaluate consequences

Wirth, Gray & Podesta, ‘3 The Future of Energy Policy Timothy E. Wirth, C. Boyden Gray, and John D. Podesta Timothy E. Wirth is President of the United Nations Foundation and a former U.S. Senator from Colorado. C. Boyden Gray is a partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and served as Counsel to former President George H.W. Bush. John D. Podesta is Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and served as Chief of Staff to former President Bill Clinton. Volume 82 • Number 4 Foreign Affairs 2003 Council on Foreign Relations

¶ A century ago, Lord Selborne, the ﬁrst lord of the Admiralty,¶ dismissed the idea of fueling the British navy with something other than¶ coal, which the island nation had in great abundance. “The substitution¶ of oil for coal is impossible,” he pronounced, “because oil does not¶ exist in this world in su⁄cient quantities.” Seven years later, the young¶ Winston Churchill was appointed ﬁrst lord and charged with winning¶ the escalating Anglo-German race for naval superiority. As Daniel¶ Yergin chronicled in The Prize, Churchill saw that oil would increase¶ ship speed and reduce refueling time—key strategic advantages—and¶ ordered oil-burning battleships to be built, committing the navy to¶ this new fuel. Churchill’s was a strategic choice, bold, creative, and¶ farsighted. The energy choices the world faces today are no less¶ consequential, and America’s response must be as insightful. ¶ Energy is fundamental to U.S. domestic prosperity and national¶ security. In fact, the complex ties between energy and U.S. national¶ interests have drawn tighter over time. The advent of globalization,¶ the growing gap between rich and poor, the war on terrorism, and¶ the need to safeguard the earth’s environment are all intertwined¶ with energy concerns.¶ The profound changes of recent decades and the pressing challenges¶ of the twenty-ﬁrst century warrant recognizing energy’s central role in¶ America’s future and the need for much more ambitious and creative¶ approaches. Yet the current debate about U.S. energy policy is mainly¶ about tax breaks for expanded production, access to public lands, and¶ nuances of electricity regulation—di⁄cult issues all, but inadequate for¶ the larger challenges the United States faces. The staleness of the policy¶ dialogue reﬂects a failure to recognize the importance of energy to¶ the issues it aªects: defense and homeland security, the economy, and the¶ environment. What is needed is a purposeful, strategic energy policy,¶ not a grab bag drawn from interest-group wish lists.¶ U.S. energy policies to date have failed to address three great challenges. The ﬁrst is the danger to political and economic security¶ posed by the world’s dependence on oil. Next is the risk to the global¶ environment from climate change, caused primarily by the combustion¶ of fossil fuels. Finally, the lack of access by the world’s poor to modern¶ energy services, agricultural opportunities, and other basics needed¶ for economic advancement is a deep concern.¶ None of these problems of dependence, climate change, or poverty¶ can be solved overnight, but aggressive goals and practical short-term¶ initiatives can jump-start the move to clean and secure energy practices.¶ The key challenges can be overcome with a blend of carefully targeted¶ policy interventions that build on the power of the market, publicprivate partnerships in ﬁnancing and technology development, and,¶ perhaps most important, the development of a political coalition¶ that abandons traditional assumptions and brings together energy¶ interests that have so far engaged only in conﬂict. Turning this¶ ambitious, long-term agenda into reality requires a sober assessment¶ of the United States’ critical energy challenges and the interests that¶ can be mobilized for the necessary political change.

Abstract intellectualism is useless—environmental philosophers should orient themselves towards real-life problems.

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So¶ animal rights philosophers have been missing the chance to find a way to many people's hearts¶ . But why is¶ this¶ so crucial? I think it¶ is crucial because it is the wrong way of practising political philosophy¶ . To see why, let usrecall a classical book by Max Weber (1968). In Politics als Beruf,¶ Weber presented an important distinction betweentwo approaches to moral reasoning. One is the 'ethics of conviction', which often follows deontology¶ , or a set of rules of conduct;¶ the other is the ethics of responsibility, according to which it would be irresponsible to actaccording to one's principles alone: rather, one should also consider what others will do as a result of one'sactions¶ . It seems to me that political philosophy has this approach in mind.¶ Political philosophy should orient itself towards real-life problems, including the problem of public good and collective action, where people tendto react in certain undesirable ways to what others do¶ . In such cases there must be a way of taking into account theeffect that my actions have (we include here both what I claim to be doing and the reasons I give for doing it) on others'behaviour and actions.¶ Political reasoning would then have two stages: first, a discussion of principles, but second,a consideration of their actual application and their effect on others' behaviour¶ .¶ However, many environmentalphilosophers¶ , while ascribing rights to animals,¶ ignore the way others may react¶ . I believe that many¶ people whomight have been persuaded of the importance of treating animals fairly¶ (using the argument of what cruelty can doto the human soul)¶ will regard the notion of animal rights as so obscure or absurd that they dismiss as madphilosophers who suggest this idea, and scorn all such claims as nonsense¶ .¶

Implementation of environmental policy must be considered

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However, it would be wrong, if not dangerous, to blame the 'other'. From the prophets in biblical times to the French revolutionaries and the early Fabians,¶ history is full of examples of theorists and philosophers who abandoned all hope of persuading others throughdeliberation, and became impatient and hence more radical in their ideas¶ . This explains why the shift fromhumanistic to misanthropic attitudes has been rapid.¶ Perhaps the 'easiest' way to solve a problem is to lose faithin a form of gradual change that can still remain respectful of humans. Such an attitude¶ , I believe,¶ onlybrings about a new series of problems encompassing dictatorship, totalitarianism, and lack of personal freedom¶ .¶ In this book I seek to maintain the philosophical impetus, not to point the finger at the politicians or the activists. Rather, I wish to examine ourselves—the philosophers who engage in discussing the environment—to discover how we might construct a theory that is much more accessible to the activists and the general public (without relinquishingany of our goals), and which can be harnessed to the aims of political philosophy. Here, the counter-argument would go something like this: 'OK, so the argumentation supplied by environmental philosophers is so removed from that used by activists and governments. So what? The only outcome of this is that more arguments, or, if you like, a pluralistic set of arguments, will emerge.Some arguments are relevant to academia alone; others can be used in politics. Thus, for example, in the university we could maintain an ecocentric environmental philosophy, 7 whereas in politics anthropocentric 8 arguments would dominate.' In response to this, it could be argued that plurality of argument is indeed welcome. Moreover, as we saw earlier,¶ thedivergence between¶ , say,¶ ecocentric environmental philosophy and anthropocentric environmental philosophy is not so vast in terms of the policies they recommend¶ . In fact,¶ as John Barry argues, 'reformednaturalistic humanism' is capable of supporting a stewardship ethics just as well¶ (J. Barry 1999 :ch. 3).¶ But¶ my point is that¶ saving the environment is not just a matter of theory: it is an urgent political mission¶ .In a democratic system, however,¶ one cannot expect policies to be decided without giving any thought to¶ how these policies should be explained to the public¶ , and thereby gain legitimacy¶ .¶ In other words, the rationale of a policy is an increasingly important, if not inseparable, part of the policy; in particular, the openness and transparency of the democratic regime makes the rationale a crucial aspect of the policy¶ .¶ A policy whose rationale is not open to the public, or one that is believed to be arrived at through a process not open to the public, is considered a-democratic¶ (cf. Ezrahi 1990). Consequently,¶ a policy'slegitimacy is owed not only to its effectiveness, but also to the degree of moral persuasion and convictionit generates within the public arena. So, when constructing environmental policies¶ in democratic regimes,¶ there is a need for a theory that can be used not only by academics, but also by politicians and activists¶ .¶ Hencethe first question in this book is, Why has the major part of environmental philosophy failed to penetrate environmental policy and serve as its rationale? The first part of this book, then, discusses this question and offers two explanations in response. These explanations are based on the premissthat environmental ethics and political theory should be differentiated and well defined so that later on they may join hands, rather than that they should be united in a single theory. It is assumed that they answer two questions. Environmental ethics is about the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. Political theory with regard to the environment relates to the institutions needed to implement and support environmental policies. Thus, the failure to distinguish properly between environmental ethics and political theory underlies the failure of the major part of environmental philosophy to penetrate environmental policy and provide its rationale. In Chapter 1 it is claimed that in a way¶ environmental philosophers have moved too rapidly away fromanthropocentrism—mainstream ethical discourses—towards biocentrism and ecocentrism¶ . 9 My argumentis that¶ the public on the whole is not ready for this¶ , and therefore many activists and potential¶ supporters of the environmental movement become alienated from the philosophical discourse on theenvironment ¶ .¶ In addition, I suggest that the reason for the gap between on the one hand environmental philosophers and on the other activists and politicians is thatenvironmental philosophers have applied the wrong approach to political philosophy. I claim that all moral reasoning involves a process of reflective equilibrium between intuitions and theory. I distinguish between 'private', 'contextual', and 'public' modes of reflective equilibrium, arguing that environmental philosophers use either the first or second mode of reasoning, whereas political philosophyrequires the third: the public mode of reflective equilibrium. The latter differs from the other two models in that it weighs both the intuitions and the theories put forward by activists and thegeneral public (and not just those of professional philosophers). The argument for this being so is that reasoning about the environment needs to include political and democratic philosophy. Andyet, most of environmental philosophers' efforts so far have focused on such questions of meta-ethics as 'intrinsic value theories' and 'biocentrism'. Environmental philosophers have been pushedin this direction out of a genuine desire to seek out the 'good' and the truth, in an effort to ascertain the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. I suggestthat¶ environmental philosophers¶ should not limit themselves to discussing the moral grounds for attitudes, or to trying to reveal the good and the truth, although these areimportant and fascinating questions. At least some of them¶ should instead go beyond this and address the matter of the necessaryinstitutions for implementing policies, and finally, and of no less importance, find a way to persuadeothers to act on behalf of the environment¶ . In other words,¶ while there is a place formeta-ethics¶ , it shouldnot be the only approach to philosophizing about the environment;¶ it should not replace political philosophy

Any environmental strategy that fails to activate political forces will fail – only state action produces effective change.

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Michael, “Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the World?,” Global Environmental Politics 1:3, August 2001, http://merlin.allegheny.edu/employee/m/mmaniate/savetheworld.pdf, page 32-33,

And yet mainstream environmentalism has not always advanced an individualized consumeristic strategy for redressing environmental ills. Even during¶ the turn of the last century, a time of zealous rediscovery of the wonders of¶ efªciency and scientiªc management, “the dynamics of conservation,” observes¶ famed environmental historian Samuel P. Hays, “with its tension between the¶ centralizing tendencies of system and expertise on the one hand and the decentralization of localism on the other . . .” fueled healthy debate over the causes of¶ and cures for environmental ills.¶ 19¶ Throughout the 20¶ th¶ century, in fact, mainstream environmentalism has demonstrated an ability to foster multiple and simultaneous interpretations on where we are and where we are heading.¶ But that ability has, today, clearly become impaired. Although public support for things environmental has never been greater, it is so because the public¶ increasingly understands environmentalism as an individual, rational, cleanly¶ apolitical process that can deliver a future that works without raising voices or¶ mobilizing constituencies. As individual consumers and recyclers we are supplied with ample and easy means of “doing our bit.” The result, though, is often¶ dissonant and sometimes bizarre: consumers wearing “save the earth” T-shirts,¶ for example, speak passionately against recent rises in gasoline prices when approached by television news crews; shoppers drive all over town in their gasoline-guzzling SUVs in search of organic lettuce or shade-grown coffee; and diligent recyclers expend far more fossil-fuel energy on the hot water spent to¶ meticulously clean a tin can than is saved by its recycling.¶ Despite these jarring contradictions, the technocratic, sanitary and individualized framing of environmentalism prevails, largely because it is continually reinforced. Consider, for example, recent millennial issues of Time and¶ Newsweek that look to life in the future.¶ 20¶ They paint a picture of smart appliances, computer-guided automobiles, clean neighborhoods, eco-friendly energy¶ systems, and happy citizens. How do we get to this future? Not through bold¶ political leadership or citizen-based debate within enabling democratic institutions—but rather via consumer choice: informed, decentralized, apolitical, individualized. Corporations will build a better mousetrap, consumers will buy it,¶ and society will be transformed for the better. A struggle-free eco-revolution¶ awaits, one made possible by the combination of technological innovation and¶ consumer choice with a conscience.¶ The “better mousetrap theory of social change” so prevalent in these popular news magazines was coined by Langdon Winner, a political-science professor and expert on technological politics, who ªrst introduced the term in an essay on the demise of the appropriate technology movement of the 1970s.¶ 21¶ Like¶ the militant recyclers and dead-serious green consumers of today, appropriate¶ technologists of the 1970s were the standard bearers for the individualization of¶ responsibility. The difference between then and now is that appropriate technology lurked at the fringes of a 1970s American environmental politics more¶ worried about corporate accountability than consumer choice. Today, green¶ consumption, recycling and Cuisinart-social-change occupy the heart of US ecopolitics. Both then and now, such individualization is alarming, for as Winner¶ notes:¶ The inadequacies of such ideas are obvious. Appropriate technologists were¶ unwilling to face squarely the facts of organized social and political power.¶ Fascinated by dreams of a spontaneous, grass-roots revolution, they avoided¶ any deep-seeking analysis of the institutions that control the direction of¶ technological and economic development. In this happy self-conªdence¶ they did not bother to devise strategies that might have helped them overcome obvious sources of resistance. The same judgment that Marx and¶ Engels passed on the utopians of the nineteenth century apply just as well to¶ the appropriate technologists of the 1970s: they were lovely visionaries, naive about the forces that confronted them.¶ 22¶

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It is this displacement of our personal ethical commitments that allows for genocidal violence to take place. The allowance of political institutions to determine what is and is not ethical action or is the root of all atrocities

Zupancic Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan, March 2000, p. 96-7

“Another problem still remains, however: the question of the possibility of (performing) an ethical act. Is it at all possible for a human subject to accomplish an (ethical) act - or, more precisely, is it possible that something like an Act actually occurs in (empirical) reality? Or does it exists only in a series of failures which only some supreme Being can see as a whole, as an Act? If we are to break. out of the `logic of fantasy', framed by the postulates of immortality and God (the point of view of the Supreme Being), we have to assert that Acts do in fact occur in reality. In other words, we have to `attack' Kant on his exclusion of the `highest good' and the `highest (or diabolical) evil' as impossible for human agents. But does this not mean that we thereby give in to another fantasy, and simply substitute one fantasy for another? Would this kind of claim not imply that we have to `phenomenalize' the Law, abolish the internal division or alienation of human will, and assert the existence of devilish and/or angelic beings? This point was in fact made by Joan Copjec,16 who defends Kant against critics who reproach him for - as she puts it - `lack of intellectual nerve,' for not having enough courage to admit the possibility of diabolical evil. The attempt to think diabolical evil (as a real possibility) turns out, according to this argument, to be another attempt to deny the will's self-alienation, and to make of the will a pure, positive force. This amounts to a voluntarist reading of Kant's philosophy, combined with the romantic notion of the possibility of a refusal of the Law. We do not contest the validity of this argument per se. But the problem is that it leaves us with an image of Kantian ethics which is not very far from what we might call an `ethics of tragic resignation': a man is only a man; he is finite, divided in himself - and therein lies his uniqueness, his tragic glory. A man is not God, and he should not try to act like God, because if he does, he will inevitably cause evil. The problem with this stance is that it fails to recognize the real source of evil (in the common sense of the word). Let us take the example which is most frequently used, the Holocaust: what made it possible for the Nazis to torture and kill millions of Jews was not simply that they thought they were gods, and could therefore decide who would live and who would die, but the fact that they saw themselves as instruments of God (or some other Idea), who had already decided who could live and who must die. Indeed, what is most dangerous is not an insignificant bureaucrat who thinks he is God but, rather, the God who pretends to be an insignificant bureaucrat. One could even say that, for the subject, the most difficult thing is to accept that, in a certain sense, she is `God', that she has a choice. Hence the right answer to the religious promise of immortality is not the pathos of the finite; the basis of ethics cannot be an imperative which commands us to endorse our finitude and renounce our `higher', `impossible' aspirations but, rather, an imperative which invites us to recognize as our own the `infinite' which can occur as something that is `essentially a by-product' of our actions.

Turns the AFF – The use of the law as the vehicle for ethical change and social activism is counter-productive. It mandates authoritarianism and violence and is independently unethical because it sacrifices relationships in the name of political expediency

Dennis Fox (Emeritus Associate Professor, Legal Studies University of Illinois at Springfield) 1991 “Law Against Social Change” http://www.dennisfox.net/papers/law-against.html

Well-meaning efforts by liberal psychologists to reform the law in keeping with values such as dignity, privacy, justice, and equality are often misguided because law exists to serve the status quo. Law inhibits the systemic, radical social change necessary for psychological and societal well-being. It does so through coercive power, substantive assumptions about human nature, the ideology of law's legitimacy, a preoccupation with procedure rather than substance, a focus on rational technicality rather than equity, and encouragement for limited, self-defeating legal solutions. Psycholegal scholars should arouse public dissatisfaction with law and assist social movements seeking to overcome legal impediments to social change. Summary [This is a summary of part of the paper that I prepared for a class.] Psychologists often advocate legal reform because they believe that psychology and law have similar values and, consequently, that the two can be partners in efforts to improve society. Not all of us, however, are comfortable with such close ties to the status quo. A large literature within psychology presents an alternative view: that we should instead break our mainstream bonds and seek radical social change in order to create a humane, egalitarian, just society. Since I share this alternative view, I evaluate the law differently from my liberal peers. Instead of compatibility between law and psychology, I see conflict. Instead of minor reform as reasonable, I see it too often as a hindrance to social transformation. And instead of law being a useful tool, I see it as an inevitable weapon against radical activism. Law, in short, is an an opponent rather than an ally of those seeking fundamental change. Much psycholegal work is already relevant to the maintenance function of law. What is needed is a reexamination of this function from the perspective of an outsider rather than an insider. In my limited time today, I want to comment on six related ways that law prevents social change. 1. Heavy Handed Use of Coercive Power The first way that law presents social change is obvious: Coercion. As Lawrence Friedman put it, Law has its hidden persuaders--its moral basis, its legitimacy--but in the last analysis it has force, too, to back it up. Law carries a powerful stick: the threat of force. This is the fist inside its velvet glove. Law is used directly and indirectly to hinder both legal and illegal social change efforts. Electoral challenges, for example, are deflected by state legislatures, which devise unreasonable deadlines, excessive petition requirements, and other hassles to keep third parties off the ballot. As an old anarchist slogan put it, if voting could change the system, it would be illegal. Activists fare little better in court. Given litigation delays, costs, procedural pitfalls, and judges' backgrounds, radicals are rarely successful. The doctrines of standing, governmental immunity, and political questions, the substance of conservative legal principles, and the likelihood of reversal upon appeal limit how much even a sympathetic judge can allow activists to win. Since law is created by the powerful rather than the weak, dissident concerns are often simply dismissed as frivolous. When activists demonstrate peacefully, they often find the law against them. Although it is no longer legitimate to arrest those who advocate change, the benign view of our "First Amendment freedoms" has a fairly short history, and has never been as absolute as many think. In the wake of the Persian Gulf War, and remembering the recent treatment given flag burners, any confidence that the public supports truly free speech is unwarranted. Surveillance, infliltration, and repression of legal activist groups continue. Harassment of activists doesn't come just from government. Corporations often file libel and other lawsuits against people who use letters to newspapers, public statements, and similar methods to criticize corporate projects such as toxic waste dumps. More than 1000 of these "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation" have been filed within the past decade. Although most of these suits are legally "unsuccessful" in that free speech rights are upheld and the activist pays no damages, the suits serve their purposes of transforming political debates into private disputes and, more significantly, tieing up activist's time and resources, bankrupting the activist, often causing the abandonment of public advocacy. When activists move on to direct action and civil disobedience, law's coercive force is clearest. Police infiltration and instigation of violent activities, selective prosecution, and preventive detention add to the likelihood of guilty verdicts and disproportionate sentences. Judges usually prevent defendants from presenting a necessity defense based on their motivations for breaking the law. When the jury is told the incident is a "simple trespassing case," for example, rather than a political act, the primary concern of the activist is dismissed as irrelevant.

Reclaiming the ability to ethically relate to individuals is a necessary pre-cursor to changing the negative conditions cited in the 1AC

Peter Hershock (East-West Center) 1999 “Changing the way society changes”, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 6, 154

I have argued at some length (Hershock, 1999) that evaluating technologies on the basis of the tools they generate commits us to taking individual users and not the dramatic patterns of our lived interdependence as the primary locus of evaluation. In doing so, we effectively exclude from consideration precisely that domain in which the values informing our technological bias have the most direct bearing on the quality of our personal and communal conduct -- the movement of our shared narration. This has led to a stubborn and at times even righteous blindness regarding our slippage into a new era of colonization -- a colonization, not of lands or cultural spheres, but of consciousness as such. Indeed, the disposition to ignore the critical space of interdependence has been so thoroughly prevalent that the conditions of possibility for this new form of colonialism are widely championed -- in both the "developed" and the "developing" world -- as essential to establishing and safeguarding our individual and collective dignity, a crucial component of our growing equality and autonomy. By using the same information technologies employed by those individuals and institutions perpetrating and perpetuating the inequitable distribution of power and wealth, social activists may have enjoyed the opportunity to "beat them at their own game." However, they have also insured that everyone remains on the same playing field, playing the same game. Social activist successes have in this way blinded us to our deepening submission to technologies of control and the consequent depletion of precisely those attentive resources needed to meaningfully accord with our changing circumstances and contribute to them as needed. The costs of such blindness are practically limitless. The more "successful" a technology is, the more indispensable it becomes. That is, all technologies are liable to crossing thresholds beyond which they generate more new problems than they solve. Because technologies arise as patterns of value-driven conduct, they function as ambient amplifiers of our individual and cultural karma -- our experience-conditioning, intentional activity. In crossing the threshold of their utility, technologies create the karmic equivalent of a gravitational black hole, funneling all available attention-energy into themselves. For the dominant technological lineage correlated with the rise of liberal democracy and the imperative for social activism, this has meant an intensification of our karma for both controlling and being controlled. The more successfully we extend the limits of control, the more we extend the range of what can and must be controlled. In capsule form: the better we get at getting what we want, the better we get at wanting; but the better we get at wanting, the better we get at getting what we want, though we won't want what we get. This karmic circularity is pernicious, and the attention-energy invested in it to date has already brought about an epidemic depletion of precisely those resources needed for realizing dramatically satisfying -- and not merely factually sufficient -- solutions to our troubles, both personal and communal. The methodological irony of social activism is that it does not free us from dependence, but rather sustains its very possibility. This is not as paradoxical as it might sound. Insuring our independence by means of restructuring the institutions that mediate our contact with one another renders us dependent on those institutions -- on the structure, and hence the technologies, of our mediation. In consequence, our freedom comes to be increasingly dependent on the rationalization and regulation of our relationships with one another -- the realization of secure and yet generic co-existence. Just as the technology-driven transformation of societies in the industrial and post-industrial eras has involved an ever more detailed refinement of class divisions and labor categories, social activism advances through an ever more varied identification of populations in need of guaranteed freedoms. In valorizing both autonomy and equality, social activism denies our dramatic interdependence and tacitly endorses not-seeing (avidyĀ) or not-attending to the full set of conditions sponsoring our present situation. Although unique and deeply local patterns of injustice may be important in building a legal case, the work of social activism is not to encourage our liberating intimacy with such patterns. Rather, it consists of constructing legal mechanisms for exerting reformative control over institutional structures and the processes by means of which (generically) given individuals play or are forced to play particular roles therein. Unfortunately, as generic 'women', 'children', 'workers', or 'minorities', the beneficiaries of social activism are effectively cut off from precisely those aspects of their circumstances, relationships, and self-understanding which provide them with the resources necessary for locally realizing meaningful -- and not merely factual -- alternatives to the patterns of injustice in which they find themselves embedded. Among the products of social activism are thus virtual communities

of individuals having no immediate and dramatically responsive relationship with one another -- individuals who have relinquished or been deprived of intimate connection with the causes and conditions of both their troubles and those troubles' meaningful resolution. With no intended disregard of the passion many activists bring to their work, social activism has aimed at globally re-engineering our political, economic and societal environments in much the same way that our dominant technological lineage has been committed to re-making our world -- progressively

"humanizing" and "rationalizing" the abundantly capricious natural circumstances into which we human beings have found ourselves "thrown." This shared strategic genealogy is particularly disturbing, suggesting that -- like all technologies oriented toward control -- social activism is liable to rendering itself indispensable. If the history of social activism is inseparable from the rise and spread of influential technologies and subject to similar accelerating and retarding conditions, so is its future. Social Activist Strategy: Legally Leveraging Institutional Change While it has become common practice to decry the excessive legalism of contemporary societies, the ramifications of strategic collusion between social activism and the way we have technically and legally tooled our factual co-existence have remained largely unattended. In part, this is because the legal bias of social activism has appeared so incontestably "practical." Legislation allows for directly restructuring power relations and negotiating justice at the "highest" possible levels. The legislative process has also become the dominant technology for mediating divergent claims about the facts of our (often troubled) co-existence and for preserving "fair" definitions of 'being right' and 'being wronged'.

Demands on the state reinforce state power – only the alternative of individual action solves

Brian Martin 1990 “uprooting war” http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw07.html

The obvious point is that most social activists look constantly to the state for solutions to social problems. This point bears labouring, because the orientation of most social action groups tends to reinforce state power. This applies to most antiwar action too. Many of the goals and methods of peace movements have been oriented around action by the state, such as appealing to state elites and advocating neutralism and unilateralism. Indeed, peace movements spend a lot of effort debating which demand to make on the state: nuclear freeze, unilateral or multilateral disarmament, nuclear-free zones, or removal of military bases. By appealing to the state, activists indirectly strengthen the roots of many social problems, the problem of war in particular. To help transform the state system, action groups need to develop strategies which, at a minimum, do not reinforce state power. This means ending the incessant appeals for state intervention, and promoting solutions to social problems which strengthen local self-reliance and initiative. What can be done about poverty? Promote worker and community control over economic resources, and local self-reliance in skills and resources. What about racial discrimination? Promote discussion, interaction and nonviolent action at a grassroots level. What about environmental degradation? Encourage local communities to re-examine their own activities and to confront damaging practices. What about sexual discrimination? Build grassroots campaigns against rape and the gender division of labour, and mount challenges to hierarchical structures which help sustain patriarchy. What about corporate irresponsibility or excess profits? Promote worker and community control over production. What about unemployment? Promote community control of community resources for equitable distribution of work and the economic product, and develop worker cooperatives as an alternative to jobs as gifts of employers. What about crime? Work against unequal power and privilege, and for meaningful ways of living, to undercut the motivation for crime, and promote local community solidarity as a defence against crime. What about enemy attack? Social defence. What about too much military spending? Build local alternatives to the state, use these alternatives to withdraw support from the state and undermine the economic foundation of military spending. These grassroots, self-managing solutions to social problems are in many cases no more than suggestive directions. Detailed grassroots strategies in most cases have not been developed, partly because so little attention has been devoted to them compared to strategies relying on state intervention. But the direction should be clear: in developing strategies to address social problems, aim at building local self-reliance and withdrawing support from the state rather than appealing for state intervention and thereby reinforcing state power. Many people's thinking is permeated by state perspectives. One manifestation of this is the unstated identification of states or governments with the people in a country which is embodied in the words 'we' or 'us.' "We must negotiate sound disarmament treaties." "We must renounce first use of nuclear weapons." Those who make such statements implicitly identify with the state or government in question. It is important to avoid this identification, and to carefully distinguish states from people. The Italian state is different from the people living in Italy. Instead of saying "China invaded Vietnam," it is more accurate and revealing to say something like "Chinese military forces invaded Vietnamese territory" or perhaps "Chinese military forces, mostly conscripts, were ordered by the rulers of the Chinese state to invade territory which was claimed by rulers of the Vietnamese state as exclusively theirs to control." Also to be avoided is the attribution of gender to states, as in 'motherland' or 'fatherland.'Many social action campaigns have a national focus, a national organisational basis and depend on national activist leaders. This is especially true when the campaign is based on influencing state elites to implement or change policies. This national orientation both reflects and reinforces a state perspective and state power. The alternative is to think and act both locally and transnationally, and to develop skills and leadership at local levels. This approach has been adopted by some social movements, but seldom on a sustained and systematic basis.

We cannot formulate a conception of the good unless we are willing to destroy our current modes of legal reasoning

Alenka Zupancic (Research - Institute of philosophy - Ljubljana) March 2000 Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan, P. 10-11

In other words, one cannot attain the realm of the ethical by means of a gradual elevation of the will, by pursuing more and more refined, subtle and noble goals, by gradually turning away from one's `base animal instincts'. Instead we find that a sharp break, a `paradigm shift', is required to move from the pathological to the ethical. Here we must resist the temptation of the standard image of Kantian ethics, according to which this ethics demands a perpetual `purification' (from everything pathological) and an asymptotic approach to the ethical ideal. Even though this image is not without some support in Kant's texts, it is nevertheless misleading - first because it invites a considerable simplification of the logic of Kant's argument; second because it obscures another very important line of argument, the claim that the Aktus der Freiheit, the `act of freedom', the genuine ethical act, is always subversive; it is never simply the result of an `improvement' or a `reform'. Thus: If a man is to become not merely legally, but morally, a good man ... , this cannot be brought about through gradual reformation so long as the basis of the maxims remains impure, but must be effected through a revolution in the [hu]man's disposition..:. He can become a new man only by a kind of rebirth, as it were [through] a new creation.5 This passage from Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone is especially important for grasping the logic of Kantian ethics. Kant's distinction between philosophical ethics and the way in which moral questions are presented in religious doctrines is no doubt familiar. Less well recognized is the fact that he situates the appropriate change of disposition [Gesinnung] in a gesture of creation ex nihilo. The impact of this gesture escapes us entirely if we see it as a kind of retreat into the irrational, as a chimera of idealism. It is, on the contrary, a profoundly materialist gesture. As Jacques Lacan points out on several occasions, it is only the acceptance of a moment of ex nihilo creation that allows an opening for a true `theoretical materialism'.6 Is not Lacan's own conception of the passage a l'acte itself founded on such a Kantian gesture? When Lacan states that `suicide is the only successful act',7 the point is precisely this: after such an act, the subject will no longer be the same as before; she may be `reborn', but only as a new subject. Thus, Kant concludes, if the expression `higher faculty of desire' is to be at all meaningful, it can be used only to indicate the fact that pure reason in itself is already practical. The higher faculty of desire, then, refers to the will of the subject as it is determined by `pure desire', a desire which does not aim at any particular object but, rather, at the very act of desiring - it refers to the faculty of desire as a priori.

AFF’s removal of all restrictions on claiming to know the sun doubleturns their speculation good arguments

Scott C. Richmond is Assistant Professor in Film and Media Studies at the Department of English at Wayne State University. Postmodern Culture > Volume 21, Number 1, September 2010 “Thought, Untethered. A review essay.” (Project Muse)

For Harman, the tool—any given object—is enmeshed in a set of total relations (i.e. the world). Meanwhile, each object is visible only very partially from any given perspective. "The bridge has a completely different reality for every entity it encounters: it is utterly distinct for the seagull, the idle walker, and those who may be driving across it toward a game or a funeral" (TSR 25). The word utterly here is doing a great deal of work: the claim is that the relation between the seagull and the bridge is of a radically different, wholly unrelated, kind than the relation between the idle walker and the bridge. This allows Harman to claim that "there is an absolute gulf between Heidegger's readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand" (TSR 26). No matter how it manifests itself, the bridge (or any other object) itself is always infinitely withdrawn. Any relation a walker, a seagull, or a driver in a car may have to it always radically misses what the bridge is, in itself. And any relation, in any modality, we may have with a tool, whether it be practical or contemplative, aesthetic or empirical, also always radically misses the object. Harman's object-orientation entails a concern with the "unchecked fury" of the withdrawn essence of objects (TSR 26). Doing justice to the object itself means affirming such fury, and also affirming that we never reach any object as it is in itself. But crucially, neither does any other object: objects are withdrawn from each other as radically as they are from us. The relation (or non-relation) between bolts and pylons is of exactly the same kind as between humans and the bridge: "all relations are on the same footing" (TSR 202). What's refreshing about Harman is his insistence that bolts and pylons deserve as much or more attention from philosophers as the typical objects of philosophy: language, knowledge, mind, etc.

They don’t solve– Battaile’s methodology changes sacrifice into something less transformative – this implicates ALL his work

Elisabeth Arnould, lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, 1996, “The Impossible Sacrifice of Poetry: Bataille and the Nancian Critique of Sacrifice”, Johns Hopkins University Press, Project Muse)

What exactly, however, does this sacrificial renunciation of words represent for Bataille and why did he choose to load it with all the transgressive weight of the experience of nonknowledge ("non-savoir")? Why place the self-sacrifice of poetry at the very center of a book that would be annulled by an immolation of speech? Indeed, why make this final "supplice"--a sacrifice of words performed and dedicated "to" "nothing"--into the core of the book's interior rapture? Isn't this figure of death and silence incurably equivocal? Does it not attribute the traditional traits of a "nothingness" to this "rapturous heart" of finitude that Bataille always wanted to designate as the "impossible" object of his experience? And is it not, therefore, condemned to appropriate, through this representation, the nonmeaning of a finitude that Bataille, far from conceptualizing as simple nothingness, usually prefers to designate ambiguously as "nonknowledge"? Such are the questions I shall address in reevaluating Bataille's concept of sacrifice in light of Jean-Luc Nancy's critique. In his article "The Unsacrificeable," Nancy was the first to point out the problematic nature of the sacrificial model in Bataille's conceptualization of finitude. According to Nancy, sacrifice, including the self-sacrifice of Rimbaud so important to Bataille, is the vehicle of an "ontotheological" appropriation. And it is through sacrifice that Bataille's reflection on finitude attempts to domesticate death while claiming to abandon it to the aporetic enunciation of a "nonknowledge." I shall thus examine the problematic figure of poetry's self-sacrifice in order to expose, with Nancy, the equivocality of its conceptual appropriation. In light of Bataille's multiple stagings and interpretations of this figure, however, I shall also attempt to demonstrate how his writing on and of sacrifice already contains the seeds of its own critique and attempts to exceed itself. Bataille did not simply want to reveal, in Rimbaud's self-sacrifice, the inexpressible truth of finitude; he also wanted to denounce the comical lie of the sacrificial appropriation. And it is this double valence of the Rimbaldian self-sacrifice that I shall try to bring forth. [End Page 86] Before elucidating the meaning and function of this figure in the specific context of Inner Experience and questioning its possible duplicity, one must examine the general notion upon which it is modeled. Poetry's self-sacrifice is the "consummate" form 1 of a sacrifice that we find in the form of stagings and commentaries in Bataille's work. As is well known, the question of sacrifice has always occupied a central place in Bataille's thought. He has not only studied this protean ethnological phenomenon we call "sacrifice" but has also wanted to give sacrifice, beyond traditional "ontotheological" interpretations and recent anthropological reconstructions, a meaning that far exceeds these restricted determinations. Sacrifice is not simply, for Bataille, a theoretical object. A paradigmatic manifestation of the sacred and its transgressions, it marks rather a limit to conceptualization and constitutes a stumbling block to thought. As such, it is, for Bataille--or, as he himself maintains, for all thought--the locus of an interruption. Cross-culturally, sacrifice delineates the limit thought comes up against when it faces what it cannot think. As the negation of our corporeal and intellectual limits, as the bloody excess that erupts before the fascinated eyes of a spectator, sacrifice "represents," for Bataille, simultaneously death and interruption. It is this interruption that he proposes as a model for his "a-theological" reflection and writing. It is the same interruption that practically structures the entirety of the experience of nonknowledge, since each and every form of this experience--mystic, erotic, or poetic--is defined as sacrifice: be it the sacrifice of the profane world, of women's bodies, or of words. In Bataille, sacrifice performs the task of something like an absolute comparative, unifying under its name all empirical variations of the experience; and it is difficult to find, in all of Bataille's work, a more exemplary model. Sacrifice is unquestionably the most prominent model in Bataille's thinking of finitude. But it is also, if one accepts Nancy's allegations, the most problematic. While hoping to find in the exemplarity of sacrifice a new paradigm for the thinking of finitude, Nancy explains in "The Unsacrificeable," Bataille does nothing but resubmit this finitude to the most traditional determinations of ontotheology. Sacrifice remains, in Bataille's thought, a deficient model for finitude insofar as it continues to be conceptually dependent on traditional philosophical and Christian interpretations of sacrifice. Thus, Nancy asserts that the characteristic valorization Bataille grants to the finite and cruel moment of immolation in his rethinking of sacrifice does nothing but repeat, by simply inverting its valence, the classical interpretation of an occidental sacrifice that conceives itself as the ideal sublation of this same moment. The philosophical and Christian version of sacrifice is understood as the spiritual transformation of a sacrificial moment the finite nature of which it denounces even as it appropriates its power. The Bataillian version, on the contrary, insists upon this finite moment in order to escape the dialectical comedy that transforms sacrifice into an ideal process. Performed in the name of spiritual rebirth, the sacrifices of Plato and Christ, for instance, reappropriate death by transfiguring it as resurrection. Grotesque and replete with horrors, death in Bataille appears alone on a stage whose cruelty is neither explained nor redeemed through transfiguration. Thus, Bataille withholds nothing from the scene of sacrifice but lets it emerge in the fullness of its amorphous violence. He valorizes its sanguinary horror in order to denounce the dialectic idealization of a death nothing should domesticate. He exhibits it "as it is": opaque, silent, and without meaning. According to Nancy, however, the valorization itself remains caught in the sacrificial logic of the idealist tradition. For, he argues, only in light of its ontotheological conceptualization can sacrifice become at once the infinite process of dialectical sublation and the blood-spattered moment this process both negates and sublates, simultaneously [End Page 87] avers and contests. The Bataillian thesis, granting efficacy and truth (reality) to sacrificial cruelty, is irremediably linked to the processes of dialecticization and spiritualization through which the philosophical and Christian West appropriates the power of sacrifice. It is the cruel counterpart of its idealization. And if this conception gives to sacrificial death an importance proportionally opposite to that which it receives from the Christian and philosophical transfiguration--since the finite truth of death plays at present the role of the infinite truth of resurrection--it still does nothing but repeat its ontotheological scheme. For it also pretends to find, on the cruel stage of sacrifice, a singular and more "real" truth of death. The stage of the torment is, for Bataille, that place where death appears with the full strength of a nonmeaning that can be exposed only through the immolation of the sacrificial victim. If this is so, then should we not suppose that this immolation pretending to give us the "inappropriable" truth of death's rapture appropriates in its turn the excess of the "excessive" meaning of this rapture? Does it not transform its excess into an "excessive truth," to be sure a negative one, though no less absolute than the philosophical and spiritual truths to which it opposes itself? At the heart of modern theories of sacrifice is thus, as Nancy puts it, a "transappropriation of sacrifice" by itself, even when, as is the case for Bataille, this theory tries to overcome sacrifice's spiritual operation through an excessive and volatile negativity. As soon as sacrifice thinks itself as revelation, be it that of a spiritual beyond or its negative counterpart, it remains a sacrifice in the name of its own transcendence, a loophole to a finitude powerless to think itself in terms other than those of a revelation: the revelation of a clear or obscure god, symbol of resurrection or of death's blind horror. If one wants to think finitude according to a model different from that of its sacrificial appropriation, one should think "apart from" sacrifice. If finitude is, as Bataille has himself wanted to think, an "access without access to a moment of disappropriation," then we must also call it "unsacrificeable" [Nancy 30].

Their affirmative commits to actual violence with only the hope of something productive to follow

Boldt-Irons, 2000 (Leslie Ann, Brock University, “Military discipline and revolutionary exaltation: The dismantling of “l’illusion lyrique” in Malraux’s L’Espoir and Bataille’s Le Bleu Du Ciel, Romanic Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, p. 481, ProQuest)

Attracted as he might have been by the risk of death - and it is Malraux's attraction to what Bataille identifies as negativity and catastrophe that interests me relative to his endorsenent of the more constructive value of political commitment - Malraux nevertheless felt that he could play a decisive role in the Republican cause. To that end, he put together a squadron out of a number of Potez 54 bombers, whose effectiveness in battle can only be questioned. Hugh Thomas describes these missions as having only limited success: "Instead, their aviation was spread out, pointless bombing attacks were carried out against non-military targets [ ... ] and such combat flying [ ... ] was marked by bravery and incompetence ... "8 Indeed, the bomber planes of which Malraux's squadron were comprised were "so slow and heavy and required so many people to man [them], that [the squadron] was nicknamed the collective flying coffin" (LI, 43). It is clear once again that the profound sincerity of Malraux's commitment to the Republican cause9 was echoed if not heightened by an equal attraction to the proximity of death and the negativity of catastrophe afforded by the experience of combat. And it is once again in this respect that a link to the values inherent in the works if not in the life of Georges Bataille may be forged. Bataille's only real experience of combat and war is extremely limited. He was enlisted briefly in the First World War in 1916 at the age of 19, but sent home a year later due to health problems. Yet in the 1930's he was a committed writer of tracts and articles proclaiming the need for a proletariat revolution. This revolution, as envisaged by Bataille, would channel the forces of hatred, rage, revolt and violence, but would begin from a fundamental and primordial anguish, without which all revolution loses its impetus: Mais aujourd'hui, si l'affectivite revolutionnaire n'a plus d'autre issue que le malheur de la conscience, elle y revient comme a sa premiere maitresse. Dans le malheur seulement, elle retrouve l'intensite douloureuse sans laquelle la resolution fondamentale de la Revolution, le ni Dieu ni maitres des ouvriers revoltes perd sa brutalite radicale.10 The importance of anguish and its role as founding principle or stimulus of revolutionary activity cannot be overestimated in Bataille's political theory. Only anguish is pervasive and destabilizing enough to set off the series of contagious and destructive actions that mark revolutionary agitation: Si un mouvement reel se produisait naissant d'une aussi grande angoisse, il devrait prendre necessairement le caractere brulant, imprevisible, contagieux a l'extreme, des grands mouvements religieux qui ont deja bouleverse les peuples et leur ont revele la valeur universelle de l'existence [ ... ] l'angoisse de la Terre entiere.11 However, if the revolutionary impulse begins in anguish and is sustained by it, it would have no concrete effect if it were not marked by fury, hatred, revolt and violence. "Seule la `violence du desespoir", writes Bataille, "est assez grande pour fixer l'attention [ ... ] sur le probleme fondamental de l'Etat" (PE, 335). This violence of despair is coupled by "un aveuglement maladif" (PE, 335) both of which are necessary if power is to be seized from the State: "pour s'emparer du pouvoir" "une violence imperative" is necessary.12 For Bataille, power will only ever be exerted by the proletariat if there is realized "une intraitable dictature du peuple arme" (UL, 380). But since this power must remain both organized and explosive, a tricky and almost unattainable balancing act is required. For the Bataille of these early tracts and articles, proletarian violence would remain ineffective if it failed to become a disciplined and organized force. "C'est la creation organique d'une vaste composition de forces, disciplinee, fanatique, capable d'exercer le jour venu one autorite impitoyable" (UL, 380). This composition of forces, though disciplined, must however be wedded to the violence that inspires it: "Une telle composition de forces doit grouper l'ensemble de ceux qui [ ... ] exigent de vivre conformement a la violence immediate d'etre humain (UL, 380)." Indeed, it is the element of violence that distinguishes the discipline of the proletarian revolution from the "servile" discipline required by the fascists: Pour faction - ORGANISEZ-VOUS! Formez les sections DISCIPLINEES qui seront demain le fondement d'une autorite revolutionnaire implacable. A la discipline servile du fascisme, opposez la farouche discipline d'un peuple qui peut faire trembler ceux qui l'oppriment.13

## 1NR

Restriction is means a specified legal boundary – existing limits on production.

Words & Phrases 2004 v37A p411

Mont. 1916. In view of Const, art. 11, § 12, viding that the permanent funds of certain state titutions shall be "invested under such regulars as may be prescribed by law." such "primary" lan in omitling from the list of securities available for the investment of permanent public funds, county, city, and town bonds, and warrants and school district bonds which do not constitute the only outstanding issue, does not conflict with article 11, § 3, providing that public school funds shall be invested so far as possible "in public securities within the state," including school district bonds issued for the erection of buildings, "under the restrictions to be provided by law"; for the phrase "under the restrictions provided by law" gives the

Legislature power to make the discrimination ex-cluding certain securities from the list of those available for investment, the word "restriction" meaning "limitation or confinement within bounds," etc., and the word "restrict" meaning "to restrain within bounds; to limit; to confine."—State v. Stewart, 161 P. 309, 53 Mont. 18.

Resolved” looking at the actions of a policy—alternative interpretations ignore the topic.

David Heidt pub. date: 4-8-05, NDT champion and debate coach @ Emory, “[eDebate] Re: Zomp and James,” <http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2005-April/061781.html>

Its not a framer's intent argument. Its a context argument. The interpretations of "resolved" that speak to people's ability to personally get off about the topic are stupid (really) b/c they assume "resolved" in the context of a specific agent--ie, "I am resolved to never post on edebate again"--which is different from "Resolved: I should never post on edebate again". The first is a statement of action. The second is a resolution. "Resolved" in the context of a debate topic just means that the community expressed an opinion by voting for a topic. from dictionary.com: 3. A formal resolution made by a deliberative body. Or here's more ev from the Lousiana House: http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required.

C. Studies prove—depth is better than breadth.

Arrington 09 (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a

(A) It’s modest: the search for truth is restricted by individual ontologies, but, methodologically, we can still test claims without expecting to create a capital “T” truth. An orientation toward a topic encourages a thorough epistemology without restricting creativity and freedom.

Cauthen, 1997

Kenneth Cauthen, the John Price Crozer Griffith emeritus Professor of Theology at Colgate Rochester Crozer Divinity School, “Relativism and Ethics: What is Truth - does it matter?” http://www.bigissueground.com/philosophy/cauthen-relativism2.shtml

I have written on subjects in theology, ethics, and philosophy and developed an outlook at least in minimalist terms that is to me convincing.[5] My intention is to describe reality as it is, to lay out propositions that correspond with the objectively existing state of affairs. Yet such is the depth of my acknowledgment of relativism and my skepticism that I do not find it useful to ask whether statements about God, the meaning of life, and the moral obligations of human beings are literally true or even approximately represent things as they really are. Non-relativists who hold certain positions with great confidence have no alternative but to say that those who disagree with them are wrong. I am not prepared to say that those who disagree with me on moral, metaphysical, and religious matters are wrong. I just say I see it differently and will act on my own convictions in appropriate ways, and that includes opposing those who differ with means proportionate to the seriousness of the issue. I also assume that every other religious, moral, and metaphysical claim is no less relative in principle than mine. Relativism, however, does not preclude passion, commitment, and action in line with one's own relative viewpoint. It ideally produces humility accompanied by acts of love in the quest for justice and an openness to deeper insight. Moreover, all claims about morality and religion can be tested by myself and others but without certain or absolutely conclusive results. The first criterion is theoretical. I can employ the rational test of coherence (internal consistency with all other propositions I affirm) and the empirical test of evidence (adequacy in accounting for the full range of experience). Yet I know that however successful I may be in applying these tests of truth, the outcome is such that only one who stands where I stand will see what I see. All I can say is that this is the best I have been able to come up with so far. Methods of justifying claims are internal to the point of view being tested and part of it, so that no method provides a way of escaping the relativity that marks all belief systems. The second and most important test is practical. Is the outlook useful in interpreting the whole range of my experience in an adequate (rationally plausible) way and in providing guidance in coping with life? When I live by what I find convincing as a rational being, are the results satisfactory and satisfying judged by the best standards available to me up to now as I continue to learn and revise both my theory and my practices? One hopes that learning, maturity, and experience will lead to increasingly adequate and fulfilling ways of believing and living, loving and hoping, thinking and acting. In the end I am a pragmatist who in the presence of the ultimate questions abandons the hope of knowing with certainty what the ultimate answers are. Nevertheless, I find in my own outlook a way of thinking and living more useful and productive than any alternatives available to me at this time. Are my religious and moral convictions literally true? Do they correspond with reality? These questions are interesting but futile. It would be the greatest miracle of all time if out of all the religions and philosophies every produced on this earth, it turned out that my own was the closest of any to getting it right, telling it like it is, picturing objective reality so that the picture and pictured are remarkably alike! I have a better chance of winning the grand lottery at chances of a 100, 000, 000 to 1. Yet I must live some way, believe something, hope for what seems most likely, and die trusting it was not all in vain. I proceed, then, as a relativist, a pragmatist, and a skeptic who employs correspondence theory as far as it will take me, but beyond the ordinary facts of mundane life, that is not very far, especially when one enters the realms of morality and religion.

(B) The impact is large: without this epistemology you should reject all ‘truth claims.’ Questions cannot be answered without crafting them in a way where they can be answered, challenged or analyzed. In this sense, their epistemology is deeply flawed.

Fish, 2002 (Stanley Fish, dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Illinois at Chicago, writes a monthly column for the Career Network on campus politics and academic careers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, “Say It Ain't So” June 21, google)

First the belief, devoutly held and endlessly rehearsed, that the purpose of writing is self-expression. The convenience of this belief, for those who profess it, is that they need never accept correction; for if it is their precious little selves they are expressing, the language of expression is answerable only to the internal judgment of those same selves, and any challenge from the outside can be met simply by saying, (as students often do) "I know what I mean," or, more precisely, "I know what I mean." Students who say and believe this will never confront an important truth: Language has its own structure (not unchanging, to be sure, but fixed enough at any one moment to serve as both a constraint and a resource). If you do not submit yourself to the conventional meanings of words and to the grammatical forms that specify the relationships between the objects words refer to, the prose you produce will say something -- language, not you or I, means -- but it will not say what you wanted to say. That's only because your readers will not be inside your head where they might ask the self-seeking expression what it had in mind, but will instead be on the outside processing the formal patterns of your written language and reaching the conclusions dictated and generated by those patterns. In fact, however, what I've just said is a bit misleading because it suggests that fully formed thoughts exist in some inner mental space and manage to make it into the outside world when they are clothed in the proper syntactical and lexical forms. But as everyone used to know before the cult of self-expression triumphed, the ability even to have certain kinds of thoughts depends on the prior ability to produce (and comprehend) certain kinds of sentences. People don't think naturally in the future perfect or in parallel constructions or in the subjunctive mood; rather these grammatical alternatives are learned, and learned with them are the ways of thinking they make possible -- relating to one another on a time-line events or states of being that have not yet happened; lining up persons, objects, and actions in relationships of similarity and opposition; reasoning from contrary-to-fact assertions to assertions about what was or could be done in the past, present, or future. These are complex mental actions, and students will be able to perform them only if their minds are stocked with the right grammatical furniture, with forms that have no specific content but make possible the organization of any content into temporal/spatial arrangements that suggest and make available modes of action in the world. The organization of the world in ways that expand the possibilities of thought and action -- that, not self-expression, is the purpose of writing, and it is preeminently a social purpose. That is, it is a purpose not pursued alone but in conjunction with others to whom one writes (in speeches, essays, letters, memos, directives, proclamations, editorials, books) with the intention of imparting information, or clarifying issues, or establishing truths or bringing about changes or rousing armies or quieting conflicts, or any of the other ends one might work for in the public arena. Writing then is, by and large, an act either of communication or persuasion, and to engage in it successfully, you have to do more than have something to say; you must be prepared to back it up, supply evidence, respond to objections, expose contradictions, parse the arguments of the opposition and so on. You must conceive yourself not as a lone voice singing in the shower, but as a participant in the multiple dialogues that are the vehicles of discursive and political life. But you will not be able to participate effectively if you are content merely to have expressed your opinion. And this brings me to the second reason so many of our students are incapable of writing intelligible sentences or of linking one bad sentence to another in something that approximates an argument. They have been allowed to believe that their opinions -- formed by nothing, supported by even less -- are interesting. The belief that what you're supposed to do is express yourself goes hand in hand with the belief that whatever you happen to express is valuable and if you believe both these things you will not believe that there is any reason to worry about subject-verb agreement or pronouns without nouns or missing transitions or anything else. In response to any question you just say the first thing that comes into your head, and in response to any challenge you just say, "That's my opinion" or "That's what I think," or "My view is as good as yours." No sentiments are more subversive of the possibility of productive classroom activity, and the instructor who hears them coming from the mouths of his or her students should immediately tell them, "Check your opinions, your ideas, your views at the door; they are not fungible currency here." This announcement, which will, at the very least, deliver a salutary shock ("I can't believe she said that"), might possibly open up a space in which writing is taken seriously because it will have identified (by an act of elimination) the true nature of academic work, which is not the work of caressing the self and its effusions, but the work of applying the techniques of reflection, analysis, and critique to matters of general (not personal) concern. But of course no action taken by a single instructor is likely to change very much in the absence of structural changes in the way writing and argument are taught. And here is where the administration comes in. Every dean should forthwith insist that all composition courses teach grammar and rhetoric and nothing else. No composition course should have a theme, especially not one the instructor is interested in. Ideas should be introduced not for their own sake, but for the sake of the syntactical and rhetorical points they help illustrate, and once they serve this purpose, they should be sent away. Content should be avoided like the plague it is, except for the deep and inexhaustible content that will reveal itself once the dynamics of language are regarded not as secondary, mechanical aids to thought, but as thought itself. Of course everyone will resist you, from the students who believe that grammar is a form of tyranny presided over by the academic version of the police, to the instructors who will believe the same and wish not to be policemen, to the experts in composition who will believe that you are incredibly reactionary and desire only to turn back the clock. But persevere, for you will be in the right. And teach such a course yourself, which is what I am going to do next fall. I'll save a place for Larry S.

particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic.